Behörden überwachen regelmäßig Messenger-Kommunikation in WhatsApp, Telegram und Signal – ganz ohne Staatstrojaner. Das geht aus einem Dokument des Zollkriminalamts hervor, das wir veröffentlichen. Ein Professor für IT-Strafrecht hält diese Messenger-Überwachung für rechtswidrig.
Who says a random QR though? Intercept mail and replace legit QR codes with the malicious ones. It’s a common tactic for criminals to put them on payment gateways such as parking meters. And cops are criminals anyway.
At least for WhatsApp and Signal, it appears the user is required to open the messenger app, navigate to the linking setting, authenticate themselves, and scan the QR code on the device that is to be linked (or one that corresponds to it, but hiding in a malicious e-mail). I can’t find any flow that allows for a QR code to link directly to the authentication mechanism, and provide the authentication code to it, while bypassing user authentication.
Who says a random QR though? Intercept mail and replace legit QR codes with the malicious ones. It’s a common tactic for criminals to put them on payment gateways such as parking meters. And cops are criminals anyway.
At least for WhatsApp and Signal, it appears the user is required to open the messenger app, navigate to the linking setting, authenticate themselves, and scan the QR code on the device that is to be linked (or one that corresponds to it, but hiding in a malicious e-mail). I can’t find any flow that allows for a QR code to link directly to the authentication mechanism, and provide the authentication code to it, while bypassing user authentication.